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Abstract 
 
This paper presents a novel theoretical and empirical approach to analyzing the industry-level 
foundations of trade disputes. Empirical research on trade disputes has been subject to persis-
tent observational challenges and selection problems: First, major determinants of trade dis-
putes, especially non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs), are unobserved. Second, systematic data 
on dispute behavior is only available for a small number of highly-escalated cases. Third, the 
eventual terms of agreement are also only known for the most prominent cases. These chal-
lenges have impeded investigations into factors that explain the overall pattern of dispute be-
havior on the industry-level and have compelled analysts to focus on non-random subsets of 
cases or on aggregate country- or dyad-level relationships instead. By overcoming the existing 
empirical challenges to the study of trade disputes for the full set of U.S. export relations, I am 
able to investigate the entire variation in dispute behavior and dispute outcomes across indus-
tries and trade partners. I demonstrate how the bilateral constellation of governments’ indus-
try-specific trade policy preferences relates to the ensuing degree of dispute escalation and, 
ultimately, to the terms on which a dispute is settled. My results have implications for dispute 
management at the WTO and international trade law more generally. 
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1 Introduction 
In times of heightened international tensions over trade policy, understanding how trade disputes 
arise, play out, and are ultimately settled is of substantial interest to researchers and policy-makers 
alike. The existing literature has uncovered various factors that are systematically related to the 
incidence of trade disputes (e.g., Allee 2008, Bown 2005, Busch and Reinhardt 2003, Davis 2012, 
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Kim 2008). However, many of these factors, such as GDP, retaliatory capacity, regime type, insti-
tutional quality, and aid dependence, are aggregate country- or dyad-level variables. Because these 
factors are identical across all industries within a dyad, they cannot explain why two countries have 
a dispute concerning some industries but not others. This applies equally to other factors, such as 
business cycle effects, bureaucratic experience, and government changes, which exhibit more time-
variation but are nonetheless located at the country-level (Davis and Bermeo 2009, Davis and Pelc 
2012, Lee 2012). As a result, it is at most possible to assess the average dispute proclivity of a country 
or dyad, but not the detailed pattern of the within-dyad variation in dispute activity across industries.  
     The limited emphasis on industry-level factors in the study of trade disputes is especially prob-
lematic because, empirically, within-dyad variation in dispute behavior across industries is huge. 
Most trade disputes concern industry-specific trade relations and policies on a fairly fine-grained 
scale. Although country pairs often engage in trade across many hundreds of different industries, 
only a handful of these relations may be seriously disputed. Yet the higher the within-dyad variation 
in dispute activity, the less informative are aggregate insights about individual cases. Consequently, 
the prevalent focus on aggregate relationships not only limits the ability of policy-makers to for-
mulate targeted policy responses.1 In a more fundamental sense, it also reveals that the deeper 
mechanism that drives trade disputes on the industry-level is not yet well understood.   
     A main reason for the aggregate focus in the literature simply lies in the difficulty of observing 
trade disputes in sufficient detail. Countries engage in millions of industry-specific bilateral trade 
interactions each year. However, the primary source of information on trade disputes consists of a 
few hundred cases that have been filed at the GATT/WTO over the last decades (see: Elsig et al. 
2012 and Horn and Mavroidis 2006 for a critical discussion). Thus, in almost all cases, we know 
virtually nothing about the potentially significant bilateral interactions and discussions surrounding 
existing industry-level trade relations – other than the fact that they were not brought before the 
WTO. This is true for both the conduct of the negotiations and their results. Moreover, for all 
cases, including the ones we observe, we do not have any systematic information about the indus-
try-specific policies and wider strategic rationales that ultimately drive the negotiations and the 
dispute behavior of the concerned governments.  
     In this article, I present empirical strategies that address these observational problems with re-
gard to the entire set of bilateral industry-level U.S. export relations between 1988 and 2012. My 
approach allows me a) to observe industry-level bargaining and dispute behavior on an unprece-
dented scale and across the full spectrum of dispute intensity, and b) to trace all these interactions 
from their initial industry-level motivations to their eventual outcomes. Ultimately, this enables me 
to observe the detailed bargaining dynamics of trade disputes and, thus, to gain a better theoretical 
and empirical understanding of conflictive trade relations. 
                                                            
1 Targeted policy responses require the ability to both accurately anticipate and correctly interpret relevant 
events. Policy-makers in national governments or the WTO may thus wish to perform targeted industry-
specific risk assessments or set up early-warning systems for disputes arising either with immediate trade 
partners or between relevant third countries. Moreover, in any dispute, an understanding of the relevant 
economic and political processes helps policy-makers to efficiently allocate resources and set priorities.   
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     Specifically, I propose and test a theory of dispute escalation, in which trade disputes of varying 
intensity gradually escalate from regular day-to-day bargaining. In this setup, trade disputes arise 
from a mutual selection process that unfolds as two governments deliberately select into increas-
ingly costly bargaining situations. On the downstream side, this selection process is driven by the 
bilateral configuration of industry-level policy preferences of the concerned governments (where 
each governments’ preferences reflect the respective political salience of the issue). On the up-
stream side, the selection process has implications for the agreed bargaining outcomes. The theory 
thus relates the bilateral constellation of preferences to both the ensuing degree of dispute escala-
tion and to the terms on which a dispute is finally settled.  
     The bulk of my empirical work consists of three distinct parts, devoted to compiling data on 
dispute drivers (salience), dispute events (escalation), and dispute outcomes (agreement), respec-
tively. First, I quantify the political salience of bilateral industry-level trade relations to the respective 
governments. To do so, I use a numeric trade policy simulation, which combines original data on 
industry-level trade barriers with data on current trade flows and trade elasticities. Based on this ap-
proach, I estimate how current trade flows would change following a possible agreement to reduce 
trade barriers after the resolution of a dispute. This procedure allows me to assess the counterfactual 
gains and losses from trade disputes for politically relevant domestic constituencies in the respective 
countries. In doing so, I approximate the political salience to the concerned governments in a way 
that captures the forward-looking assessments that governments necessarily make in strategic settings 
such as trade disputes. 
     Second, I compile an extensive new dataset on dispute events using a purpose-built automated 
text analysis routine to extract information on bargaining and dispute events from U.S. trade reports. 
The resulting data describe the interactions between the United States and its 80 most important 
trade partners. For each bilateral relationship, the data cover interactions over some 300 different 
products over 25 years. Because my data capture escalation and dispute behavior down to very low 
levels of intensity, they make it possible to reconstruct the complete dispute histories of tens of thou-
sands of industry-level trade relations. Despite their exclusive focus on U.S. trade relations, my data 
constitute the most extensive and detailed resource on trade disputes currently available. Moreover, 
because my data are not biased towards highly-escalated cases, they evade the observational and se-
lection problems associated with existing resources such as the WTO data.  
     Third, I use an indirect method to measure dispute outcomes and assess the terms on which 
disputes are eventually settled (i.e., which side has made the larger concessions). Specifically, I match 
changes in observed trade flows to the timing of dispute events from my U.S. trade disputes dataset. 
I use this strategy to capture the trade effects that result from the implementation of agreed settle-
ments. I am thus able to infer the terms of these agreements (that are often difficult to observe 
directly) from their observable implications.  
     Based on these data, I then test the observable implications of my theory. I find that i) the 
degree of dispute escalation is limited by the lower of the two governments’ salience levels, in line 
with theoretical expectations that low-salience parties are more willing to make concessions early 
on to avoid the costs of continued dispute escalation; ii) the variability (variance) in the terms of 
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agreements decreases with the ultimately reached escalation level, in line with theoretical expecta-
tions that more highly escalated disputes tend to result in mid-range compromise agreements in 
which both sides make some concessions; iii) the dispute initiator manages, on average (mean), to 
secure more favorable terms of agreement at higher escalation levels, in line with theoretical ex-
pectations that there is strategic pre-selection into anticipated high-level disputes.  
     My work contributes in several ways to the study of trade relations and trade disputes. First, I 
present new theory and evidence that our understanding of trade disputes by zooming in on the 
detailed logic of industry-level bargaining and dispute dynamics. Second, I provide extensive new 
data on various aspects of trade disputes and thereby solve long-standing observational challenges. 
Third, I introduce new methods to the study of trade disputes that, along with extensive documen-
tation and code, allow researchers to adapt and extend my empirical strategies. Lastly, my results 
have broad implications for policy-making and dispute resolution.  
      I proceed as follows. The next section presents the observational challenges to the study of 
trade disputes and discusses the extant literature in light of these difficulties. In Section 3, I present 
the theoretical considerations underlying my work. The discussion in this section serves two pur-
poses: It is, in part, necessary for my measurement strategy and, in part, serves to derive hypotheses 
that will subsequently be tested. I discuss these issues together because they reflect the domestic 
political process (preference formation; measurement) and the international political process (stra-
tegic dispute behavior; hypothesis testing), respectively, and thus constitute a single theoretical ac-
count. Section 4 then describes all aspects related to data and measurement. Sections 5 and 6 pre-
sent the methodology and results of my primary analyses. The final section concludes and discusses 
the policy implications of my findings.   
2 Observational Challenges to the Study of Trade Disputes  
The fact that trade disputes have been studied extensively, at first glance, masks the substantial ob-
servational difficulties associated with observing key aspects of these phenomena. These difficulties 
start with the limited observability of the dispute events themselves: Existing data on trade disputes 
is strongly biased towards the most visible, highly-escalated cases. The by far most-studied disputes 
are the GATT/WTO dispute settlement cases. A focus on these cases dominates both the case study 
literature (e.g., Baron 1997, Hufbauer et al. 2006, Perdikis and Read 2005, Petersmann and Pollack 
2003, Room and West 1998, Thies 2013, Zeng 2013) and the quantitative literature (e.g., Allee 2008, 
Bown 2005, Busch and Reinhardt 2003, 2009, Francois et al. 2008, Kim 2008). A handful of studies 
examine the smaller sets of NAFTA disputes or unilateral U.S. disputes based on the Section 301 
legislation (Bayard and Elliot 1994, Hoberg and Howe 1999, Taylor 1997), while others compare 
WTO disputes and U.S. Section 301 cases (Grinols and Perrelli 2006, Pelc 2010).2 
     While studying these major disputes is unquestionably important, the lack of comparison cases 
and their features constrains what can be learned from investigating high-profile cases alone. To see 
                                                            
2 Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 is among the more controversial parts of U.S. trade law. The legislation 
provides the basis for unilateral retaliatory action against foreign trade barriers by the U.S. government. 
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what remains unobserved when focusing exclusively on available data sources, consider Figure 1. The 
figure exemplarily displays the dispute history of the U.S.–Argentina footwear dispute over the time 
period from 1988 to 2012. The dispute has been swelling for years when the U.S. took it before the 
WTO, where it was discussed between October 1996 and March 1999. The dispute went through 
the arbitration procedure and climaxed in 1998. In this year it was taken before the Appellate Body 
before initial agreement was reached and discussions over the implementation of the agreement be-
gan. However, the dispute was never fully resolved and resurfaced around 2010. 
     The data shown in Figure 1 are taken from my dispute events dataset, which I present in more 
detail in Section 4.2. The figure also depicts the three measures I derive from the raw data to serve 
as dependent variables in my primary analysis. The maximum escalation measure reflects the highest 
escalation level of a dispute over the 1988–2012 period. The dispute intensity measure sums the escala-
tion levels over all twenty-five years. It can be thought of as the discrete version of the ‘area under 
the curve’ and provides a more holistic summary of the overall dispute history by taking the entire 
information into account. Lastly, the dispute duration measure captures the length of dispute activity. 
 
Figure 1: The U.S.–Argentina Footwear Dispute, 1988–2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note that the available information on this dispute would be much more limited, if one had to rely 
on the WTO data. In this case only the years 1996-1999 would be observed. In this case, the maxi-
mum escalation measure could still be computed, but there would be insufficient information to 
compute either the dispute duration nor the dispute intensity. After all, only 4 out of 25 data points 
concerning this dispute are observed in the WTO data. More importantly, footwear is just one of a 
large number of products countries produce and trade. My data provide dispute histories for close to 
300 products per dyad (for the detailed product classification, see: Appendix A). Yet the U.S. has 
taken Argentina before GATT/WTO dispute settlement only over footwear, textiles, pharmaceuti-
cals, and agricultural chemicals since 1988. The WTO data thus provide essentially no information 
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DV I. Maximum escalation  
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(other than that they were not taken before the WTO) about the dispute histories of almost 99 per-
cent of U.S.–Argentinian trade relations. For all these cases, none of the measures shown in Figure 
1 can be calculated.    
      These problems are even more pronounced on a worldwide level because the U.S.–Argentina 
dyad ranges well above the global average in its use of the WTO dispute settlement system: Since the 
inception of the WTO in 1995, some 540 cases have been brought before the WTO. This yields an 
average of 23 cases per year. However, the WTO has by now more than 160 members, which means 
that there are more than 25,440 (160 times 159) directed dyads. With up to hundreds of traded prod-
ucts per dyad, this implies that there are millions of bilateral industry-level trade relations at any given 
point in time, only 23 of which are taken before at the WTO each year. Based on the readily available 
data on trade disputes, we are therefore blind to almost the entire variation in the conflictiveness of 
trade relations.  
     The uneven picture of trade disputes that arises from existing data sources means that, compara-
tively speaking, we do not know what cases we are actually looking at and how these cases differ 
from the ones we do not observe. This is true, in particular, concerning the questions of how less 
escalated disputes differ from major ones in their pattern of dispute outcomes and in the conditions 
that motivate these disputes in the first place.  
     In terms of dispute outcomes, for instance, the traditional information on trade disputes only 
allows comparisons within the small number of highly escalated disputes. Busch and Reinhardt (2003, 
2001), for instance, investigate the negotiated solutions of GATT/WTO cases and find that early 
settlements tend to yield larger concessions for the complainant. Similarly, Bayard and Elliot (1994), 
Taylor (1997), and Pelc (2010) compare the outcomes of unilateral U.S. trade enforcement under 
Section 301 and multilateral action under the GATT/WTO. The studies report a lower effectiveness 
of unilateral enforcement relative to multilateral action, arguing that the former is seen as relatively 
less legitimate by concerned trade partners.  
     While these insights are important, they do not illuminate a) what the distribution of outcomes is 
below the set of high-profile cases, and b) how the outcomes of highly escalated disputes compare 
to the outcomes of the large number of less escalated cases. Existing data simply do not provide the 
full picture and therefore cannot provide answers to how the majority of disputes are resolved. They 
only provide a snapshot of a non-representative set of cases. Insights gained from these data therefore 
do not generalize to larger set of disputes and, importantly, cannot reveal the overall mechanism that 
produces dispute events and outcomes.  
     This challenge is even more evident with respect to the initial dispute motivations. In large part 
because of the sparse information on disputes events and the resulting low ‘positive-case’ to ‘nega-
tive-case’ ratio, most scholars have tended to study aggregate measures of dispute activity – usually 
counts per country or dyad. By necessity, this has resulted in a focus on aggregate predictors as well. 
Here, a substantial additional complication is that, in addition to dispute events, applied trade barriers 
and the resulting motivational drivers of trade disputes (i.e., the political salience of bilateral industry-
level trade relations) are unobserved as well.  
     Broadly speaking, the findings in the literature fall into two categories. A first category concerns 
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classic country- and dyad-level factors. Here, research has shown that countries tend to be involved 
in a larger number of GATT/WTO disputes if they have higher aggregate export volumes (Sattler 
and Bernauer 2011) as well as larger economies (Francois et al. 2008). Retaliatory capacity in terms 
of import market size or development aid relationships has also been shown to affect dispute partic-
ipation (Bown 2005). Relative economic size is also reported to play a role, favoring the larger, more 
powerful side (Guzman and Simmons 2005, Sattler and Bernauer 2011). There is also evidence that 
countries with more effective legal and political institutions are engaged in larger numbers of disputes 
(Busch and Reinhardt 2003, Horn et al. 1999).  
     A second category of findings concerns monadic, dyadic or aggregate factors that have a dynamic 
or temporal dimension. Lee (2012) as well as Davis and Pelc (2012) present evidence suggesting that 
macro-economic conditions influence countries’ propensities to seek WTO arbitration. Davis and 
Bermeo (2009) hold that earlier dispute experience increases the participation rates of countries in 
later cases, suggesting a learning mechanism. Pelc (2014) presents evidence that countries initiate 
disputes at the WTO to set (informal) precedents. Reinhardt (2000) and Bown (2002, 2004a, 2004b) 
suggest that countries file retaliatory disputes. That is, dyads with a dispute are prone to experiencing 
a second dispute in the reverse direction (Busch and Reinhardt 2002, p. 464, present a list of cases 
they suspect to be retaliatory in nature). 
     All these findings are important and further our understanding of trade disputes. Importantly, 
however, they further our understanding of trade disputes on an aggregate level by highlighting gen-
eral tendencies. Thus, the above results enable us to anticipate that larger countries will, on overage, 
be involved in a larger number of high-level trade disputes. They do not, however, enable us to 
anticipate what products are likely to be subject of these disputes. Put differently, one might expect 
that, based on their economic size and trade volumes, the U.S. and Argentina are likely to experience 
a handful of WTO disputes over a 25 year period. But it remains entirely unclear whether these 
disputes arise over footwear and pharmaceuticals or over beef and automobile parts.  
     Making these assessments requires more information. In particular, it requires knowledge about 
the industry-level drivers of individual disputes and, therefore, mandates an analysis on the disaggre-
gate industry-level rather than on the aggregate country/dyad-level. The key point is that trade dis-
putes are industry-level phenomena (i.e., they usually arise because countries disagree over the effects 
of trade policies for specific products). For this reason, variations in industry-level preferences can 
explain variations in dispute escalation. By contrast, country/dyad-level concepts such as market size 
or relative economic power cannot explain within-dyad variation in dispute activity. Since these fac-
tors are constant across all product-related policies two countries may disagree over, they cannot 
explain why countries enter into a dispute over one product but not over another.  
     To move in this direction, some analysts, notably Bown (2005) and Allee (2008), have opted for 
a more strongly design-based approach to study dispute initiation. Bown (2005) focuses on a small 
number of discriminatory policies that were ruled as being illegal by the WTO. He then compares 
the characteristics of the actual complainants to characteristics of countries that Bown identifies as 
potential complainants (that were also affected by the policies) but only participated in the dispute as 
interested third parties, or not at all. This strategy is aimed at identifying meaningful non-cases by 
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design. Allee (2008), in turn, focuses on anti-dumping (AD) measures and countervailing duties 
(CVD) because, in contrast to other non-tariff barriers, such trade contingency measures are gov-
erned by relatively strict reporting standards under the GATT/WTO. He then examines whether 
these measures were challenged at the WTO.  
     The fact that Bown (2005) and Allee (2008) are essentially alone in making an effort to take trade 
barriers into account when studying the determinants of trade disputes exemplifies the observational 
difficulties associated with trade disputes. Despite their thoughtful approach, however, these studies 
can only alleviate these difficulties to a degree. First, both studies, by design, only consider a small 
number of cases. Second, their design restricts attention to a non-complete set of barriers for the 
given set of cases (given that many other forms of tariff and non-tariff barriers may or may not affect 
the trade flows under consideration). Lastly, the data used by the authors indicates merely the pres-
ence of certain barriers but does not allow a quantitative assessment of the economic effects of these 
barriers on trade flows.  
     These limitations preclude an assessment of the concerned governments’ political salience levels 
associated with the respective cases. This means that the key motivations of trade disputes are unob-
served. Together with the limited information on disputes escalation, especially at the lower and of 
the spectrum, and the limited information on eventual dispute outcomes, these limitations pose a 
substantial challenge to the study of trade disputes. Ultimately, this hampers efforts to uncovering 
the mechanism that governs trade disputes more generally.  
3 Theory and Hypotheses: The Political Salience of Trade Relations, Dis-
pute Escalation, and Dispute Outcomes 
Given the foregoing considerations, gaining deeper insights into trade disputes requires two things. 
First, we need better information on the political salience of trade relations as a key dispute determi-
nant, as well as better information on actual dispute events, and eventual dispute outcomes. Second, 
we need an understanding of how these factors interrelate to produce the empirical pattern of dis-
putes that characterizes international trade relations. On the surface, the first step is essentially a data 
requirement, while the second is a requirement for theoretical specification. On closer inspection, 
however, both steps require considerable theoretical reasoning, in particular, because assessing the 
political salience of trade relations heavily depends on existing theoretical knowledge of international 
trade and trade policy.  
     Below, I lay out the theory for both steps. I begin with discussing the political origins of govern-
ment preferences toward industry-level trade relations. Here, the emphasis is on the domestic political 
level (in both exporter and importer countries). The discussion provides the basis for my empirical 
strategy to measure the political salience of trade relations in Section 4.1. It presents a ‘measurement 
theory’ for assessing government preferences that is based on the counterfactual gains and losses that 
result from the potential trade policy reforms for politically relevant constituencies. I then describe 
how bilateral preference constellations affect the strategic interactions of governments, and thus pro-
duce the empirical pattern of dispute escalation and outcomes. Here, the focus is on the international 
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level. I also derive hypotheses that are tested in Sections 5 and 6.  
3.1 How the Political Salience of Trade Relations Arises 
Government preferences over trade policy result from a domestic preference aggregation process. In 
the domestic political struggle over trade policy formulation, there are three main sets of actors: con-
sumers, producers, and the government. In the relationship between these groups, the influence of 
producers on government trade policy exceeds that of consumers – both in importer and exporter 
countries (Corden 1997, Destler 2005, Grossman and Helpman 2002). This situation arises for well-
known reasons. Olson (1965) has first pointed out that large, dispersed groups (consumers) are in a 
worse situation to effectively exert pressure on the government than small, well-organized groups 
(producers). Because consumers are a large group, each individual’s gain from organizing pressure 
on the government is too small to justify the necessary personal effort. Moreover, consumers are 
simultaneously interested in the whole set of products they purchase. Producers, in contrast, only 
care about a single industry.3 These circumstances allow producers to dominate the domestic prefer-
ence aggregation process over trade policy issues.  
     In the importing country, government preferences will thus be biased toward the protection of 
import competing industries. While the resulting protectionist policies can take different forms (e.g., 
tariffs, quotas, taxes, or other non-tariff barriers), they all drive a wedge between the prices of do-
mestic and imported products. Trade barriers are thus government manipulations of the market 
mechanism. By making imports more expensive, these barriers induce consumers to buy a larger 
share of domestically produced products than they otherwise would. As a result, domestic producers 
can not only sell larger quantities, but also charge higher prices.  
     Through protectionist policies, governments revoke or forestall the ‘gains from trade’ that result 
from trade liberalization. A direct implication of the large economic literature on trade is that, on an 
economy-wide scale, reciprocal trade liberalization increases aggregate national welfare (Jones 1956; 
1965, Krugman 1980, Melitz 2003, Ohlin 1933, Ricardo 1817, Samuelson 1948; 1971). For each 
country, this aggregate welfare increase arises, in particular, because consumer gains from trade lib-
eralization (through lower prices) outweigh producer losses from increased import competition. 
Trade barriers inhibit these effects. Domestically, these measures thus result in an inefficient redistri-
bution of income from consumers to producers that reflects the unequal political weight of the two 
groups in shaping government policy.  
     By imposing trade barriers, however, governments not only affect the domestic distribution of 
income. They also affect the distribution of income between domestic producers and the export 
industries of their trade partners. Trade barriers by definition restrict market access and so result in 
lost sales for foreign producers – and therefore directly hurt the politically relevant constituencies in 
the trade partner’s polity. In effect, the imposition of trade barriers implies a unilateral revocation of 
                                                            
3 Grossman and Helpman (1994) further refine this argument by highlighting the deeper political process by 
which producers exert influence in political systems where successful electoral competition is dependent on 
campaign contributions. 
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the linkage agreements that are at the heart of larger bilateral and multilateral efforts to increase ag-
gregate welfare through trade liberalization. These linkage agreements envisage that each side bears 
some of the hardship from trade-induced structural change – in return for lower prices (on the con-
sumer side) and larger export markets for competitive industries (on the producer side).    
     In terms of domestic political currency, a government that reneges on earlier agreements by pur-
suing protectionist policies thus benefits twice – once by opening foreign markets for competitive 
domestic industries, and a second time by subsequently closing its domestic market to protect less 
competitive domestic producers from foreign imports. In the exporting country, by contrast, the 
government of an affected trade partner loses twice – once by exposing domestic industries to in-
creased foreign competition by concluding the initial agreements, and a second time by seeing its 
competitive export industries unable to reap the promised benefits of increased access to foreign 
markets. Unilateral protectionist policies thus lead to pronounced imbalances in the distribution of 
politically relevant costs and benefits between importer and exporter governments. It is not surpris-
ing, therefore, that ‘unfair’ trade practices have the potential to result in trade disputes. 
     To assess how such disputes play out, the crucial question is how to properly quantify these inter-
ests for all bilateral product-level trade relations. It is intuitively clear that the salience of a trade 
relationship is related to the monetary value of the trade flow concerned. Higher trade volumes are, 
all else equal, likely to be more relevant for producers, and thus more important to national govern-
ments, than lower trade volumes. However, my goal is to go beyond this intuitive but crude under-
standing of salience by quantifying the actual stakes politically relevant constituencies have in the 
observed trade relationships.  
     Essentially, I wish to assess the effect of trade policies on the sales potential for domestic and 
foreign producers. This involves relating sales opportunities under given levels of protection to the 
potential sales opportunities that would materialize under lower levels of protection. The crucial point 
is that trade disputes are not actually about existing trade flows but about the additional trade flows 
inhibited by trade barriers. This implies that the monetary value at stake in a dispute is not the value 
of the actually existing trade flow but the difference in value between the existing trade flow and the 
counterfactual trade flow that would materialize if current trade barriers were to be reduced or re-
moved. Importantly, the same observable trade value can be associated with very different potential 
sales opportunities (and resulting salience levels) for both the importing and the exporting sides. 
     On the importer side, the political salience of industry-level trade flows depend on two factors 
beyond the observed trade value. First, it depends on the size of currently applied trade barriers 
because higher existing barriers imply larger increases in imports if abolished or reduced. Second, 
it depends on the price-sensitivity of domestic consumers with regard to the product in question 
(i.e., elasticities). Given information on trades barriers and trade elasticities, it is then possible to 
calculate the expected increase in total industry-level imports that would result from a hypothetical 
reduction of existing barriers. This estimate can in turn be used to calculate the ratio of the expected 
increase in imports to the current level of imports. I define this counterfactual loss share as my salience 
measure for the importer government. It is equivalent to the percentage increase in import competi-
tion for domestic producers resulting from the reduction of trade barriers.  
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     On the exporter side, the political salience of a trade relationship depends on two factors as well. 
First, it depends on the size of the importer’s counterfactual losses, as defined above, because these 
losses define the range in which the growth potential for export sales can lie. Second, it depends on 
the exporter’s current position in the import market relative to other exporter. This is because the 
majority of trade barriers are applied on an MFN basis so that the importer’s trade barriers affect all 
exporters (this holds, in particular, for non-tariff barriers; see: Bacchetta et al. 2012). Similarly, trade 
barrier reductions should be expected to benefit all exporters because selective reductions for indi-
vidual exporters are usually inconsistent with international trade law. I therefore define the fraction 
of the importer’s losses that would accrue to the exporter’s producers, the counterfactual gain share, as 
my salience measure for the exporter government. This definition of the exporter’s salience implies 
that the importer typically has a ‘defender advantage’, an issue I discuss further below.  
     Defining the salience measures as described is not only consistent with existing theories of trade 
and trade policy. It has other important advantages as well. For one, note that by incorporating cur-
rent levels of trade protection, the importer’s salience measure implicitly reflects factors such as the 
strength of domestic lobbies for different industries or the government’s susceptibility to these lob-
bies. Similarly, exporting producer’s current success in the importer’s market reflect factors such as 
geographic distance or the relative competitiveness of the industry. Most importantly, my focus on 
counterfactual quantities captures the forward-looking assessments that feeds into the strategic 
decision-making calculus of governments.  
3.2 How Bilateral Salience Constellations Affect Dispute Behavior and Outcomes 
Given an appreciation of how the domestic political salience of industry-level trade relations arises 
for individual governments, the next step is to ask how bilateral constellations of different salience levels 
affect dispute behavior and, ultimately, dispute outcomes. For this purpose, I take a closer look at 
the bargaining process that accompanies trade disputes. I begin by noting that this bargaining process 
has a coercive component: Trade disputes are costly and dispute escalation, which increases the cost-
liness of a dispute, is a strategic move at the hands of the concerned governments.  
     It has long been known that the creation of costs can be used to secure concessions (e.g., Schelling 
1966, Snyder and Diesing 1977). Specifically, Cramton (1991) has shown how, in a bargaining situa-
tion in which two parties incur non-zero fixed-costs, the side with the lower costs can secure better 
agreements compared to a situation in which neither side incurs fixed-costs (assuming identical issue-
valuations). Given that I am primarily interested in the role of parties’ salience, I recast these results 
to analyze varying issue-valuations (see: Appendix B, for a more detailed derivation of the following 
argument). If the bargaining parties have identical costs but differ in their issue-valuations, then the 
party with the higher valuations has an advantage. This follows because higher issue-valuations make 
parties more cost-tolerant. As a result, high-valuation (or high-salience) parties are in a better bar-
gaining position than low-valuation parties. 
     In real-world situations, however, parties are uncertain about their opponent’s exact bargaining 
power. As a result, the parties cannot simply reach the agreement that reflects their relative bargaining 
power. Grossman and Perry (1986) analyze this problem in the relatively simple context of bargaining 
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under one-sided uncertainty. They show how, under uncertainty, the uninformed party gradually 
screens the opponent for its strength. This process involves a sequence of offers over time. Initial 
offers favor the uninformed party in the hope that the opponent is in a weak bargaining position. By 
accepting costly delay, strong types of the opponent credibly signal their strength. Bargaining thus 
results in a string of concessions over time until agreement is reached. Similar analyses have subse-
quently been applied to variety of bargaining situations (e.g. Cramton and Tracy 1992; 2003, Powell 
2004, Slantchev 2003, Spier 1992; 2007).  
     To derive valid expectations about bargaining behavior in trade disputes, I extend on the above 
logic by introducing two crucial aspects: I allow for mutual (i.e., two-sided) uncertainty; and I allow 
for non-constant bargaining intensity and dispute costs (i.e., dispute escalation). First, acknowledging 
mutual uncertainty is important for formulating accurate expectations about dispute behavior be-
cause it reflects real-world conditions and affects theoretical predictions. Importantly, under mutual 
uncertainty, both sides screen each other. Both sides therefore initially make offers favoring them-
selves and gradually lower their demands. Bargaining then no longer consists of a one-sided sequence 
of concessions but approximates the back and forth of typical negotiations. Bargaining under mutual 
uncertainty also implies that high-salience types of both sides signal their strength by accepting costly 
delays to agreement, while low-salience types select out earlier by accepting less attractive deals.  
     Second, I expect this bargaining process to be directly linked to dispute escalation. In particular, I 
expect that disputes constantly intensify as bargaining continues. This follows from two opposing 
considerations. On the one hand, parties have an incentive to escalate. This is because the differences 
in the parties’ cost-tolerances, which are induced by their varying issue-valuations, become more rel-
evant as the overall bargaining costs increase. A rise in bargaining costs, therefore, implies a more 
attractive agreement for the high-salience party. In addition, weak opponents select out faster if costs 
are higher. Thus, because escalation promises larger gains while selecting out weak opponents at a 
higher rate, it promises better deals earlier on. On the other hand, escalating quickly can be unnecessarily 
costly if the opponent has low salience and would already have made substantial concessions in the 
presence of much lower costs. Parties thus need to strike a balance in their escalation strategy. This 
balance results in gradual and continuous dispute escalation during bargaining.  
     The discussion so far implies that low-salience types of both sides select out earlier at lower levels 
of escalation. It also implies that high-salience types of both sides stay in the game longer while 
disputes escalate further. Thus, disputes end at low levels of escalation as long as at least one side has 
low salience and escalate only if both sides have high salience. This implies the following interaction 
hypothesis about the relationship between the parties’ salience constellation and dispute escalation:  
 
H1: The interaction of the exporter government’s salience level and the importer government’s salience 
level should be associated with longer dispute durations and higher levels of dispute escalation.  
 
Given an expectation of how the combination of parties’ salience levels are related to dispute escala-
tion, it is natural to ask how the agreed outcomes of disputes vary with their level of escalation. This 
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question addresses a more subtle aspect of the conflictive bargaining process. In particular, the pres-
ence of uncertainty makes point predictions for individual cases impossible (if point predictions were 
possible, the concerned governments would be able to produce them as well and would therefore be 
able to avoid the costly bargaining process). However, it is possible to derive expectations over the 
summary statistics of these outcomes. In the following, I therefore focus on both the mean and the 
variance of bargaining outcomes as a function of observed escalation levels.  
     To begin with, note that dispute outcomes are not determined in a vacuum. Rather they depend 
on a pre-existing status quo. The outcomes of interest, therefore, are not the terms of an initial agree-
ment (be it explicit or implicit) but the changes in an existing agreement.4 Trade disputes thus typically 
serve to re-negotiate an existing agreement. This implies an additional role of the parties’ salience in 
determining the eventual bargaining outcome. What counts for the change in agreement is not the level 
of parties’ political salience but the change in this salience (this contrasts with the absolute levels of 
dispute escalation, as discussed above, which does depend on the parties’ absolute salience levels). 
Irrespective of the level, the change in the parties’ salience can increase or decrease. In other words, 
a weak initial bargaining position does not preclude an improvement over time, and vice versa.  
     These consideration have implications for the relation between the mean in the change in dispute 
outcomes and dispute escalation. To see this, first note that, in disagreements over import policies, 
the exporter chooses whether to initiate a dispute episode. This means that the exporter can abstain 
from doing so if the endeavor appears fruitless and overly costly. Consequently, the exporter has an 
initiator advantage. Essentially, the fact that the exporter can pick its fights induces a second selection 
effect prior to any observable interaction, which might tilt the bargaining position in observable dis-
putes in the exporters favor. More specifically, I expect this selection effect to be prevalent, in par-
ticular, in situations where the exporter anticipates high dispute costs in combination with insufficient 
improvements in the eventual agreement.5   
     From the preceding discussion, it follows that high levels of escalation, and therefore high dispute 
costs, are expected only if both sides’ salience levels are high. High-salience exporters should there-
fore be particularly cautious in initiating disputes with high salience importers. The logic is this: If 
high-salience exporters were to always initiate disputes with high-salience importers, there would be 
as many exporters whose salience has increased since the status quo agreement was reached as there 
are exporters whose salience has decreased. The same holds for the importer. The average change in 
outcome the exporter can expect is therefore equal to zero. When accounting for the substantial costs 
of highly escalated disputes, the exporter ends up with a net loss.  
     However, the exporter can boost the chances of success by initiating only if its own salience has 
increased. Alternatively or complementarily, the exporter may invest in finding out whether the im-
porters salience levels have decreased and initiate accordingly. This situation looks different if at least 
one party has low salience so that dispute costs will be low. Here, self-selection is much less relevant. 
A low-salience exporter, for instance, may utter a complaint toward a trade partner without larger 
                                                            
4 This is also reflected in my measurement strategy for implied trade policy changes discussed below. 
5 This is also why, in re-negotiation contexts, observationally the exporter’s initiator advantage can be expected 
to trump the importer’s defender advantage (that plays into determining the nature of the initial status quo).  
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consideration of both sides’ exact changes in salience. Because the cost of a complaint is near zero, 
the self-selection pressure is low in low-profile contexts. Therefore, exporters should be expected to 
act more prudently in initiating disputes that are expected to escalate further. This suggests the fol-
lowing hypothesis6: 
 
H2: The exporter should, on average (mean), secure larger reductions in trade barriers and thus larger 
relative increases in trade flows in disputes that have escalated further, due to strategic pre-selection. 
 
Next, it is also possible to derive an expectation about the variance in the change in dispute outcomes 
as a function of dispute escalation. Recall that high escalation levels imply the interaction of two high-
salience parties. From the preceding discussion it is also clear that both sides shift from making offers 
favoring themselves to gradually lowering their demands over the course of their interaction. This 
happens as both sides learn about their respective opponent’s high salience as signaled by the con-
tinued bearing of dispute costs. The longer the parties bargain and the further the dispute escalates, 
the more the parties’ offers converge from opposite directions. The resulting compromise agreement, 
therefore, constrains the range of possible outcomes. Consequently there should be low variation in 
agreed outcomes after highly escalated disputes.  
     By contrast, at low levels of escalation, the variation in outcomes should be considerably larger. 
This is the case because a larger set of bilateral type combinations is consistent with low level disputes. 
While high-level disputes require both sides to have high salience, low-level disputes are observed as 
soon as one side has low salience. Thus, only a single combination of the salience combinations is 
consistent with maximum escalation (high-high), while several salience combinations are consistent 
with minimal escalation (high-low, low-low, low-high). Yet while all these combinations are associ-
ated with low escalation levels, they result in very different bargaining outcomes. A high-salience 
exporter that is bargaining with a low-salience importer obtains a favorable agreement, and vice versa. 
Intermediate combinations result in outcomes between these extremes.  
     This relationship directly extends to the variability in changes that can be expected in a re-negotia-
tion setting. In mutually high-salience scenarios, both parties will be more resistant not only to initial 
concessions but to changes from the status quo as well. So even small changes in the status quo are 
strongly resisted. At the same time, salience combinations resulting in low levels of escalation involve 
at least one side with low levels of salience, which therefore does not resist very strongly to changes 
in the status quo. Consequently, low escalation scenarios should be associated with larger variability 
in trade policy changes in either direction. This suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: The variability (variance) in agreed changes in trade policies, and thus changes in trade flows, 
should be lower in more highly escalated disputes. 
 
                                                            
6 Note that Hypothesis 2 is consistent with the observation that WTO disputes are disproportionately won by 
complainants (Davis 2012), as well as with evidence from domestic law suits, which points in the same direction 
(Waldfogel 1998). 
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Together, Hypotheses 2 and 3 state that higher levels of escalation should be associated with an 
increase in the mean and a decrease in the variance of observable changes in trade flows.  
4 Data and Empirical Strategy: Measuring Salience, Escalation, and Out-
comes 
This section presents the empirical strategies I employ to compile previously unavailable data on 
government preferences, dispute events, and bargaining outcomes. It introduces both the methodol-
ogy and the key results.  
4.1 Salience: Expected Gains and Losses from Potential Trade Barrier Reductions 
Measuring the importance of policy issues for national governments is challenging because govern-
ment preferences cannot be directly observed. In Section 3.1, I presented a theory of preference formation 
that provides the basis for my measurement strategy. This theory outlined how the counterfactual 
gains and losses from the potential trade policy changes, which may result from a dispute, form the 
basis for my measure of political salience. To calculate this measure, I need to quantify these gains 
and losses. To do so, I employ a trade policy simulation model that allows me to approximate the 
total change in industry-level imports that would result from a given trade barrier reduction by an 
importing country in a given industry. I begin by describing the actual calculation of my salience 
measure and then move backwards by describing the auxiliary information I need for this calculation 
and how I collect it.  
     Figure 2 graphically depicts the idea behind my salience measure. Panels (a) and (b) represent the 
before and after scenarios of the simulated barrier reduction. Panel (a) reflects the initial situation. 𝑀  
indicates the status quo level of imports of product 𝑘 into country 𝑗 in the presence of currently 
applied trade barriers. 𝑃 − 𝑋  indicates domestic production minus exports. The area of the entire 
square 𝑀 + 𝑃 − 𝑋  is domestic consumption, i.e., the total size of the domestic market for the 
given product. Panel (b) shows the result from simulating a reduction of the current trade barrier 
whilst taking into account the product-specific elasticity. 7  
     The asterisk (*) in Figure 2 indicates the theoretical mechanism, described mathematically below, 
that translates the hypothetical change in the trade barrier into a predicted increase in imports, from 𝑀  to 𝑀  (I assume a barrier reduction by 25 percent)8. This change depends on both the size of 
the barrier and the price-sensitivity of consumers. Essentially, the higher the initial barrier before the 
reduction, and the more price-sensitive (elastic) demand for the product in question, the larger this 
increase will be. The predicted increase in imports simultaneously implies a decrease in the size of 
                                                            
7 Note that I omit time subscripts throughout the discussion. This is because both the estimation of elastic-
ities and the estimation of trade barriers require the time-variation in the input data. The resulting estimates 
are thus time-averaged quantities in a cross-sectional format. 
8 The value of 25 percent is arbitrary but inconsequential because the predicted changes in imports are 
proportional to the percentage reduction of the barrier. The overall pattern of gains and losses therefore 
remains the same.  
16 
 
the domestic market controlled by domestic producers (𝑃 − 𝑋 ).  
 
Figure 2: Measuring Salience – Hypothetical Trade Barrier Reductions and the Resulting Gains and Losses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (a)       (b)        (c)         (d)  
 
These predicted changes form the basis for the calculation of the political salience measure for the 
importer and exporter governments. To see this consider panels (c) and (d) of Figure 2. These panels 
stack panels (a) and (b) on top of each other to make the predicted changes more explicit. ∆𝑀  is 
the predicted increase in imports resulting from the hypothetical trade barrier reduction. By relating 
the predicted increase in imports following the barrier reduction to the observed value of imports prior 
to the barrier reduction (i.e., ∆𝑀 /𝑀 ) as shown in panel (c), it is possible to arrive at an estimate of 
the importer’s counterfactual losses (in terms of increased foreign competition) relative to the status 
quo. The quantity ∆𝑀 /𝑀  can be seen as the importer’s loss share and thus a measure of the 
political salience of the trade relationship to the importer government. I denote this loss share by 𝐿 .9 In the application at hand it will always concern a U.S. trade partner. 
     To calculate the exporter’s (i.e. the United States’) gain share another step is required. Note that 𝐿  concerns the importer’s total imports of a product from all exporters. The setup assumes that any 
trade barrier reduction implemented by the traded partner will apply to all exporters – in conformity 
with the Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) non-discrimination clause of international trade law and the 
importer’s resulting defender advantage discussed above. Zooming in and following a similar logic 
on the exporter-specific level, it is possible to arrive at an estimate of the United States’ predicted 
gains relative to the gains of all other exporters (i.e., ∆𝑀 /∆𝑀 ) as shown in panel (d). This quan-
tity reflects how much of the trade partner’s losses from trade liberalization the United States is likely 
to capture. This quantity, which for an MFN-style barrier reduction is proportional to the U.S. market 
share prior to the reduction, can be seen as the United States’ gain share, 𝐺 . It is thus as a measure 
of the political salience of the trade relationship to the U.S. government.  
     To actually calculate 𝐿  and 𝐺 , I need to know the expected change in imports, ∆𝑀 . I assess ∆𝑀  using the aforementioned trade policy simulation10. The idea underlying the simulation is based 
                                                          
9 Appendix C shows that this quantity equals the percent change in import competition faced by the trade 
partner that results from the barrier reduction. 
10 In implementing the procedure, I closely follow the methodology presented by Jammes and Olarreaga 
(2005; also see: WTO 2012). 
𝑃 − 𝑋  𝑀  𝑀  ∆𝑀  
𝐿  
∆𝑀  
∆𝑀  𝐺  
𝑃 − 𝑋  𝑀  * 
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directly on the definition of the import demand elasticity, which reflects how sensitive import de-
mand for a given product 𝑘 in country 𝑗 is to changes in the price for this product (which is affected 
by the presence of trade barriers). The import demand elasticity reflects the price-sensitivity of con-
sumers by capturing how much imports change as prices change by a certain amount. This price-
sensitivity, in turn, depends on the degree to which the product is homogeneous or differentiated, 
which makes them more or less easily substitutable. Consumers are less price-sensitive towards dif-
ferentiated products, which are specialized and/or branded and thus difficult to substitute with other 
varieties of the same product (e.g., cosmetics). The reverse holds for homogenous products, which 
are similar across suppliers and therefore easy to substitute (e.g., palm oil). For any given increase in 
import prices, the corresponding decrease in imports will be smaller for differentiated than for ho-
mogeneous products. Differentiated products thus tend to be less price-elastic and have lower elas-
ticities.  
     Formally, the import demand elasticity is defined as the percent change in imports relative to the 
percent change in price as given by   
 𝜎 =  %∆𝑀  %∆𝑃 = ∆𝑀 /𝑀∆𝑃 /𝑃 , 
 
where the superscript 𝐷 signifies the total domestic demand for imported goods, 𝑀  are aggregate 
imports by 𝑗 of all national varieties of product 𝑘, and 𝑃  are domestic prices inclusive of the tariff-
equivalent effect of policy barriers to trade11. Thus, 
 𝑃 =  𝑃∗ 1 + 𝑡 , 
where  𝑡 = 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟 /100, 
 𝑃∗ reflects international prices, and 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟  is the sum of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and tariffs in 
percentage terms (i.e., a barrier of 100 percent implies a doubling of the products price). 𝑃∗ should 
be interpreted as the world price of product 𝑘 in case that this good is perfectly homogenous. Like-
wise, if product 𝑘 is differentiated, 𝑃∗ should be interpreted as the weighted average price of the 
different imported varieties. The import demand elasticity thus captures the percent change in im-
ports in response to a percent change in domestic prices due to changes in policy barriers.  
     Note that quantity of interest – the expected change in imports resulting from a given reduction 
in policy barriers – can be computed directly from equation (1) by solving for ∆𝑀 :  
 ∆𝑀 = 𝜎 𝑀 ∆𝑃𝑃 . 
 
                                                            
11 For notational simplicity, the following discussion focuses on aggregate imports from all exporters thus 
omitting an additional subscript 𝑖 for different exporters. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
18 
 
In order to compute ∆𝑀 , however, more information is needed because both ∆𝑃  and 𝑃  depend 
on 𝑃∗, which is unknown. To solve this issue assume, for now, that the international price 𝑃∗ is 
unaffected by changes in 𝑃 . This is the so-called ‘small country assumption’, since small countries 
have little market power and are thus unable to influence international prices. This assumption im-
plies that the export supply facing importer 𝑗 is infinitely elastic (for brevity, I relegate the discussion 
of how this assumption can be relaxed as well as various other details of the procedure to Appendix 
D; note that the actual simulations I perform are based on this more general model).  
     Given infinitely elastic export supply, ∆𝑃  is simply determined by the change in 𝑡 . Concretely, 
because 𝑃 = 𝑃∗ 1 + 𝑡 = 𝑃∗ + 𝑃∗𝑡 , we have ∆𝑃 = (𝑃∗ + 𝑃∗(𝑡 + ∆𝑡 )) −  (𝑃∗ + 𝑃∗𝑡 ) =𝑃∗∆𝑡 . Using this result and the definition of 𝑃  from equation (2) and plugging both into equation 
(4), one gets ∆𝑀 = 𝜎 𝑀 𝑃∗∆𝑡𝑃∗(1 + 𝑡 ), 
which simplifies to ∆𝑀 = 𝜎 𝑀 ∆𝑡(1 + 𝑡 ). 
 
Note that the international price, 𝑃∗, cancels and the entire right-hand side of equation (6) is now 
expressed in terms of quantities that are either known or can be estimated. Specifically, current im-
ports 𝑀  are directly observed in international trade data (UN Comtrade). Data on policy barriers 𝑡  are taken from Martini (2018a). The change in trade barriers ∆𝑡  is specified as part of the policy 
simulation. This leaves the elasticities 𝜎  to be estimated.  
     To estimate 𝜎  I need to relate changes in prices to changes in imported quantities. In practice, 
this procedure is complicated by the fact that prices and quantities are interrelated. Because prices 
rise as quantity demanded increases and quantity demanded falls as prices rise, these quantities are 
subject to reverse causality. I therefore use the structural estimation procedure following Feenstra 
(1994) and Broda and Weinstein (2006), where the relationship between prices and quantities is esti-
mated in a system of simultaneous equations. Importantly, because identification in this approach is 
achieved through the effects of supply shocks from the set of exporters to a given market, the method 
works in the absence of information on trade barriers.12    
     The implementation of the procedure is complex and discussed in full length in the appendix, 
along with extensive information on data sources and detailed results. Here, I limit myself to estab-
lishing the plausibility of the results. Figure 3 presents plots of the estimated elasticities against two 
different measures of product differentiation. As noted above, differentiated products should have 
lower elasticities. The figure suggests that the estimated elasticities conform with this expectation.  
     The left panel of Figure 3 shows boxplots of the product-wise elasticity estimates against the 
product categories defined by Rauch (1999), which have become the standard measure for product 
                                                            
12 Note that I average all elasticities across countries 𝑗, resulting in a single elasticity for each product 𝑘, i.e.,  𝜎 . I do so because there is a clear theoretical reason to expect elasticities to vary across products, while there 
is no theoretical reason to expect variation across countries. 
(5) 
(6) 
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differentiation in the literature. Rauch divided goods into three broad groups depending on whether 
they are exchange-traded, reference-priced, or differentiated (with product differentiation increasing 
from the first to the last). The right plot of Figure 3 plots the elasticity estimates against a measure of 
import price dispersion across countries. The idea here is that price dispersion across different mar-
kets should be lower, the more homogenous a product is and the more it therefore has a single world 
price. By contrast, higher price dispersion should be seen for more differentiated products. In line 
with expectations, these products have lower estimated elasticities. Formal statistical tests supporting 
these visual results are reported in the appendix including all relevant details on definitions and cal-
culations.  
 
Figure 3: Estimated Elasticities Plotted Against Rauch Categories and Import Price Dispersion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With the data on elasticities in hand, I am finally able to calculate my political salience measures 𝐿  
and 𝐺  as defined above and move on to dispute events and outcomes.     
4.2 Dispute Escalation: U.S. Trade Bargaining and Enforcement Histories 
This section presents a more detailed overview of how I collect my data on dispute events as pre-
viewed in Section 2. My data collection strategy centers on an automated content analysis (ACA) of 
the United States’ National Trade Estimate (NTE) reports. These reports are compiled and submitted 
to Congress each year by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), the primary 
U.S. government agency responsible for formulating and implementing U.S. trade policy. They con-
tain extensive information on the actions taken by the U.S. government to reduce or eliminate foreign 
barriers that hamper U.S. exports. 
     The NTE reports are thus a rich source of information on the bargaining and escalation behavior 
of international trade relations. However, the verbal nature of the NTE reports has so far hindered 
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quantitative researchers from accessing this wealth of information. The ACA routine I develop allows 
me to systematically extract the verbal information from the reports and to translate it into machine-
readable data. These data capture the U.S. trade bargaining and enforcement histories across some 
eighty trade partners and three-hundred industries (or products) over the 1988–2012 period. By cov-
ering the entire range of escalation levels from inaction and passive complaints, to active diplomatic 
exchanges at various levels of intensity, to sanctions and retaliatory action, the data provide a nuanced 
picture of the pattern of conflictiveness surrounding U.S. trade relations. 
     With my empirical focus on U.S. export relationships, I trade a smaller coverage of the interna-
tional trade network (compared to existing data on WTO dispute settlement) for a much more com-
prehensive view on the conflictiveness of trade relations. The more completely and correctly my data 
capture the actual dispute behavior, the more this empirical strategy allows me to study the bargaining 
and escalation patterns of trade disputes in the absence of the selection problems inherent in the 
WTO data.  
     An important initial question therefore is whether the NTE reports, which constitute the textual 
source of my data collection procedure, accurately reflect the actual bargaining and escalation patterns 
of U.S. export relations without being subject to selection effects of their own.  
     For two interrelated reasons, the NTE reports likely describe U.S. trade enforcement actions ac-
curately. On the one hand, USTR has no incentive to understate government actions taken to 
strengthen U.S. trade interests abroad. These actions demonstrate the U.S. government’s commit-
ment towards ‘the national interest.’ Greater market access abroad is typically beneficial for industries 
and workers alike because it increases export sales and secures employment. Export-related trade 
enforcement activities are likely to unambiguously boost the government’s standing at home. On the 
other hand, USTR also cannot realistically overstate U.S. government actions. The NTEs are subject 
to critical scrutiny of Congress. The NTEs are part of an accountability exercise to review the U.S. 
government’s work concerning trade negotiations and enforcement. It is therefore implausible that 
exaggerated accounts of U.S. activities will go unchallenged. Together, these points ensure the validity 
of the NTE reports as a source of verbal information on dispute escalation.   
     To extract this verbal information, I implement a dictionary-based automated content analysis 
(ACA) routine. The goal of this purpose-built procedure is to translate the unstructured textual in-
formation of the reports into structured data. Specifically, I am interested in data that uniquely links 
U.S. trade bargaining and enforcement actions to individual products across all trade partners and 
over time. That is, I require data in a partner-product-action-year format. A dictionary-based ACA method 
is most appropriate for extracting detailed sub-document level information of this kind. The tech-
nique allows effective dimensionality reduction by condensing a diverse set of words, phrases, and 
expressions into a manageable number of pre-defined and mutually exclusive categories. At the same 
time, dictionary methods can be tailored specifically to match the structure and content of the textual 
input documents (for an overview, see: Liu and Zhang 2012). 
     The text-to-data transformation of the NTE reports is greatly aided by their well-demarcated sub-
ject-matter, their clear structure, and their stylized wording. First, the NTEs provide comprehensive 
but exclusive accounts of U.S. trade bargaining and enforcement actions. This removes the need for 
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separating out irrelevant input information and thus eliminates a potential source of error. Second, 
the NTEs exhibit a highly structured and standardized language. This increases the precision of the 
ACA routine, limits the overall length of the dictionaries, and increases the fit of the search terms. 
Third, the annual publication format and the structuring of the reports into country chapters imme-
diately identify two key dimensions of the resulting data, namely the year and the trade partner.  
 
Table 1: NTE Automated Content Analysis Dictionary – Products, Partners, and Dispute Escalation  
Escalation  
level 
Product 
referenced 
U.S. interests 
referenced 
U.S. action 
referenced 
Type of  
U.S. action 
Example 
action 
8 1 +1 +6  “sanctions” 
7 1 +1 +5 robust “sues” 
6 1 +1 +4  “threatens” 
5 1 +1 +3 active “presses” 
4 1 +1 +2  “seeks” 
3 1 +1 +1 passive “is concerned” 
2 1 +1 0  n.a. 
1 1 0 0 none n.a. 
0 0 0 0  n.a. 
 
Notes: If an explicit reference is made in a NTE country chapter with regard to a given product, this results in a 
baseline score of 1, otherwise the score is 0. If U.S. interests are referenced in addition to a product reference, the 
score increases by 1. If a U.S. action is referenced as well, the score increases by 1-6 points depending on the type 
of action. A reference to U.S. actions is interpreted as also implying a reference U.S. interests (i.e., if the first is given, 
the second is thought to be given as well). The overall score determines the escalation level attributed to an product-
partner observation in a given year.  
 
What remains, therefore, is to correctly identify and link the individual products and the respective U.S. 
actions. To implement this procedure, I compiled three separate dictionaries. The first dictionary at-
tributes verbal references to products to a standardized product-classification scheme. The second 
and third dictionaries identify U.S. actors and U.S. actions (in both cases distinguishing between in-
dustry and government). The core task of the ACA routine is to attribute the correct U.S. action to 
each product. This attribution follows the logic outlined in Table 1. The lowest escalation level of 0 
is ascribed if there is no reference to a product at all. For higher escalation levels, more stringent 
requirements need to be fulfilled. For instance, a level of 2 requires a product reference alongside a 
reference to respective U.S. industry interests. Similarly, a level of 3 requires a product reference 
alongside a U.S. government reference and a passive U.S. government action. Higher escalation levels 
are ascribed based on more active or robust U.S. government actions.  
     The complete technical details of the ACA routine are descried in greater detail in Appendix E, 
which also contains the dictionaries, the replication code, the final data, and the complete validation 
materials (in addition see: Martini 2018b). To provide an indication of the validity of the results pro-
duced by the ACA, Figure 4 presents a selection of dispute histories for a range of industries between 
the United States and Japan over the 1988–2012 period. The individual panels of the plot compare 
the machine-coded data to data that was manually coded from the same reports.  
 
𝑦𝑒𝑠 𝑦𝑒𝑠 𝑦𝑒𝑠 
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Figure 4: Comparison of Machine and Hand-coded U.S.–Japanese Dispute Histories, 1988–2012 
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Visual inspection suggests considerable agreement between the two data series. Although the overlap 
in the data is not perfect, the general trends and patterns are clearly identified by the ACA. Given 
that complete manual coding of the NTE reports is a) infeasible due to the immense time investment 
machine-coded  
hand-coded  
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and b) not necessarily imperfect as well13, these results appear quite satisfactory.  
     As a more comprehensive validation, I systematically compare the results of the automated coding 
procedure against the entire hand-coded data for Japan across all industries. I find that the hand-
coded and machine-coded data exhibit correlations ranging between .73 and .76 depending on the 
aggregation method. While again these correlations are not perfect, they are further substantiating 
the validity of the results. Overall, the data resulting from the ACA procure contain 51,503 partner-
product-action-year observations with an escalation level of at least 1 (i.e., cases in which at least a prod-
uct reference is made). From these data, one can reconstruct the dispute histories of thousands of 
product-level trade relations between the U.S. and its trade partners.  
4.3 Dispute Outcomes: Implied Trade Policy Changes 
To assess on what terms disputes end after they have escalated to various degrees, I calculate a meas-
ure that I refer to as implied trade policy changes. The goal is to identify the degree to which one side 
prevailed in a dispute by assessing changes in the importer’s trade policies following the conclusion 
of the dispute. Unlike the information on dispute escalation, the information on dispute outcomes 
cannot be extracted from the NTE reports. This is simply because the reports do not contain this 
information, in particular, for a large share of the less escalated disputes. Consequently, a focus on 
the NTEs alone does not allow me to link the pattern of dispute escalation to the pattern of dispute 
outcomes. To obtain the required information, I assess the changes in trade barriers resulting from a 
dispute, by investigating the effect of these changes on the underlying observable trade flow.    
 
Figure 5: Measuring Dispute Outcomes as Implied Trade Policy Changes  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I implement this strategy by measuring the changes in bilateral industry-level trade flows that corre-
spond to the timing of the dispute history (see: Figure 5). I begin by calculating the average value of 
U.S. exports in industry 𝑘 to trade partner 𝑗, 𝑋 , over two time windows, 𝑡1 and 𝑡2. The first time 
                                                          
13 In particular, because frequent multiple references to the same product made across different parts of the 
NTE country chapters are very hard to keep track of. 
 
𝑋𝑈𝑆𝑗𝑘_𝑡2𝑋𝑈𝑆𝑗𝑘_𝑡1
Year 
Esc 
2010 2000 1990 1995 2005 
24 
 
window consists of the three years prior to the first dispute year. The second time window consists 
of the three years following the last year in which the maximum escalation level of a dispute is 
reached. I average within the time windows to mitigate measurement error in trade values for indi-
vidual years as well as to reduce loss of information due to missing data points. To account changes 
in price levels over time, I inflation-adjust all trade data using GDP-deflators prior to performing any 
calculations. 
     The choice of the time windows is based on the assumed bargaining activities of the parties. The 
first window is intended to capture trade flows under a relatively new or existing trade barrier before 
the trade partner can make any concessions that become effective while the parties are bargaining. 
This window may not capture the effect of barriers that were imposed or stiffened before the United 
States initiated bargaining. This cannot be averted, however, because moving into the bargaining 
phase would not only lead to overlaps with potential early concessions. It would also lead to overlaps 
with the second time window in the case of short disputes. The choice for the second time window 
is based on the assumption that, consistent with theoretical predictions, the parties explicitly or im-
plicitly reach agreement at the end of the highest escalation period. The implementation of such an 
agreement should then become visible in the beginning of this second window.  
     Based on the two average trade flows within the time windows, I calculate the implied trade policy 
change, reflected in the change in U.S. exports from the first to the second time window, as follows:  
 ∆𝑋 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑋 _𝑋 _ . 
 
Equation 7 defines the change in trade as the log-ratio of the average trade value in the second time 
window to the average trade value in the first time window. The logarithm ensures that changes are 
symmetric in both directions because 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑥/𝑦)  =  −𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑦/𝑥). For instance, if trade after a dispute 
is four times larger than before a dispute, the ratio inside the brackets equals 4/1 = 4. By contrast, if 
trade after a dispute is four times smaller than before a dispute, the ratio equals 1/4 = .25. In other 
words, if trade increases, the ratio can range anywhere between one and infinity, whereas if trade 
decreases, the ratio ranges somewhere between zero and one. The logarithm allows expressing these 
changes in a balanced manner. For instance, the logarithm of 4 to base 10 is approximately .6, whereas 
the logarithm of .25 to base 10 is approximately –.6. Because the logarithm of 1 is zero, this transfor-
mation allows a natural interpretation of changes in both directions.   
5 Analysis I: Dispute Escalation as a Function of the Political Salience Con-
stellation 
This section is devoted to testing Hypothesis 1. It analyzes the relationship between (i) the political 
salience of bilateral industry-level trade relations for the United States and its trade partners, and (ii) 
the degree to which these trade relations escalate into trade disputes.  
(7) 
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5.1 Methods 
To investigate this relationship statistically, I fit a series of twelve different interaction models based 
on my political salience measure and the data resulting from the automated content analysis. These 
models have the general form  
 𝐸𝑠𝑐 = 𝑔 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝐺 +  𝛽 𝐿 + 𝛽 𝐺 𝐿 + 𝛿𝑀 + 𝛾 +  𝛾 + 𝜀 ,          (8) 
 
 
 
where 𝐸𝑠𝑐  is one of the three dependent variables discussed earlier – maximum escalation, overall 
dispute intensity, or dispute duration between the United States and a trade partner 𝑗 in industry 𝑘. Next, 
inside the function 𝑔(. ), 𝛼 is an intercept. The following three terms specify the interaction specifi-
cation that captures the logic of Hypothesis 1. The coefficient 𝛽  on the multiplicative term 𝐺 𝐿  
is the parameter of primary interest. The coefficient 𝛿 on the term 𝑀  captures the effect of the 
overall imports on dispute escalation. Note that 𝐺 = ∆𝑀 /∆𝑀  and 𝐿 = ∆𝑀 /𝑀 , are a 
set of ‘nested ratios’ (∆𝑀  is the denominator in the first and the numerator in the second ratio) that 
express the countries’ salience levels in relative terms. 𝑀 , as the only non-simulated quantity, is the 
relevant ‘anchor’ value in absolute value terms. 𝐺  and 𝐿  thus decouple the bilateral salience 
constellation from the size of the underlying trade value. The two salience measures can therefore 
also be thought of as capturing the parties’ relative stakes in the dispute (𝑠 ), whereas 𝑀  can be 
thought of as capturing the absolute stakes (𝑠 ). 
     Next, 𝛾  and 𝛾  are two sets of dyad and product fixed-effects that account for unobserved het-
erogeneity (𝑢) at the dyad and product levels.14 The first set of fixed-effects accounts for dyad-specific 
factors. In particular, the dyad effects account for the parties’ relative power or the parties’ relative 
cost absorption capacities. This ensures that the actor-level explanations for trade disputes , on which 
much of the existing literature has focused, are fully included in the model. The dyad effects further 
account for factors such as economic structure and development, and the quality of bilateral political 
relations. The second set of fixed-effects accounts for product/industry-specific factors such as over-
all size and productivity of the industry, or industry-specific differences in lobby strength. 
     Lastly, 𝑔(. ) represents a set of link functions for four generalized linear models (GLMs), while 𝜀  represents an error term with the corresponding error structure. The four models are the Linear 
(identity link), the Tobit (Probit/identity link), the Ordered Logit (generalized logit link), and the 
Poisson (log link) models. Since all three dependent variables, 𝐸𝑠𝑐 , are non-negative, contain 
relatively many categories, have right-skewed distributions, and are (except for the duration variable) 
non-interval-scaled, there is no model that perfectly fits all aspects of the data, but the above selection 
reflects some candidates.  
     For the analysis, all time-varying economic data, in particular 𝑀 , are aggregated into a cross-
                                                          
14 Note that dyad and importer effects are identical in my data, which contains the U.S. as the sole exporter. 
𝑠                                 𝑠          𝑢  
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section (i.e., 𝑀 ) by averaging the inflation-adjusted values over time. This is necessary because of 
the non-time-varying nature of the salience measures 𝐺  and 𝐿  and because the construction of 
the three escalation measures results in a cross-sectional setup. Although aggregating over the time-
dimension results in a loss of information, the costs are limited.  This is, in particular, because the 
detailed structure of multilateral industry-level data still allows to control for unobserved heteroge-
neity using a fixed-effects specification. This point is discussed in more detail below. 
5.2 Results 
Table 2 reports the results for all combinations of the three dependent variables and four models. 
The first thing to note is that the results clearly support the interaction logic formulated in Hypothesis 
1. With the one exception of the Poisson model of dispute duration, the coefficient of interest on 
the multiplicative term 𝐺 × 𝐿  is substantively large and statistically significant in all cases. These 
results suggest substantial increases in escalation and dispute severity for mutual increases in the par-
ties’ salience levels.  
 
 
Table 2: Relating Maximum Escalation Levels to Counterfactual Gain and Loss Shares (Salience) 
 DV: I. Maximum Escalation 
 Linear Tobit Ologit Poisson 𝐺  
 
–1.789*** 
(0.484) 
–1.717 
(0.987) 
–1.405 
(0.821) 
–0.636 
(0.348) 𝐿  
 
–0.745 
(0.684) 
–1.980 
(1.414) 
–1.555 
(1.181) 
–0.949 
(0.561) 𝐺 × 𝐿  
 
8.823*** 
(1.580) 
9.995*** 
(2.688) 
8.156*** 
(2.228) 
3.011*** 
(0.887) 𝑀  
 
0.044*** 
(0.008) 
0.025* 
(0.012) 
0.029** 
(0.010) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
Log Sigma 
 
– 
0.773*** 
(0.017) 
– – 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑘, 𝑗 = 𝑖𝑗 𝑘, 𝑗 = 𝑖𝑗 𝑘, 𝑗 = 𝑖𝑗 𝑘, 𝑗 = 𝑖𝑗 𝑅   0.525 – – – 
Log-likelihood – –5264.1 –4507.8 – 
 DV: II. Dispute Intensity 
 Linear Tobit Ologit Poisson 𝐺  
 
–10.504 
(5.623) 
–22.623** 
(7.546) 
–0.749 
(0.804) 
0.142 
(0.448) 𝐿  
 
4.327 
(5.415) 
–33.323** 
(10.596) 
–0.308 
(1.166) 
0.449 
(0.681) 𝐺 × 𝐿  
 
74.007*** 
(17.145) 
128.933*** 
(22.417) 
8.572*** 
(2.185) 
2.227* 
(1.111) 𝑀  
 
0.657*** 
(0.130) 
1.117*** 
(0.010) 
0.041*** 
(0.009) 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
Log Sigma 
 
– 
2.975*** 
(0.017) 
– – 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑘, 𝑗 = 𝑖𝑗 𝑘, 𝑗  𝑘, 𝑗 = 𝑖𝑗 𝑘, 𝑗 = 𝑖𝑗 𝑅   0.507 – – – 
Log-likelihood – –9636.3 –8496.2 – 
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 DV: III. Dispute Duration 
 Linear Tobit Ologit Poisson 𝐺  
 
–1.212 
(1.106) 
–3.131 
(2.065) 
–0.379 
(0.933) 
0.777 
(0.525) 𝐿  
 
–0.329 
(1.026) 
–10.047*** 
(3.049) 
–1.214 
(1.434) 
–0.304 
(0.986) 𝐺 × 𝐿  
 
9.735** 
(3.204) 
25.027*** 
(6.020) 
6.510** 
(2.479) 
0.279 
(1.280) 𝑀  
 
0.093*** 
(0.019) 
0.208*** 
(0.024) 
0.030** 
(0.010) 
0.010** 
(0.003) 
Log Sigma 
 
– 
1.558*** 
(0.023) 
– – 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑘, 𝑗 = 𝑖𝑗 𝑘, 𝑗  𝑘, 𝑗 = 𝑖𝑗 𝑘, 𝑗 = 𝑖𝑗 𝑅   0.375 – 
 
– – 
Log-likelihood – –4362.4 –3597.4 – 
 
Notes: Dyad or World Bank importer income group (𝑗 ), and industry (𝑘) fixed-effects are included as indicated; 
intercept and fixed-effects coefficients are not reported. Importer income group effects are used in two models 
instead of dyad effects because convergence issues in the maximum likelihood estimation precluded the use of dyad 
effects. 𝑀  is measured in billion (10 ) US$ for meaningful coefficient interpretation. Huber-White robust stand-
ard errors for Linear and Poisson models and regular standard errors for Tobit and Ordered Logit models are in 
parentheses; ***, **, and * indicate significance at the .001, .01 and .05 levels, respectively. 𝑁 = 4,758 for all models.  
 
Across all models, the usual interpretation of interaction terms applies. The implied slope of one 
constituent term therefore depends on the value of the second constituent term. The slope on 𝐺  
is then given by 𝛽 𝐺 + 𝛽 𝐺 𝐿 = (𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐿 )𝐺 , where (𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐿 ) is the composite 
coefficient on 𝐺  that changes with the level of 𝐿 . Analogously, the composite coefficient on 𝐿  
is (𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐺 ). The individual coefficients 𝛽  and 𝛽  on 𝐺  and 𝐿  thus only describe the 
implied slopes for each variable if the other equals zero. Note that throughout the coefficient esti-
mates on the constituent terms 𝐺  and 𝐿  are much smaller in absolute size than the coefficient 
on the interaction term and largely insignificant.  
     These results are fully in line with my theory. Because one would not expect any dispute escalation 
if either of the two parties has no stakes in an issue, one would expect these coefficients to be close 
to zero statistically insignificant. The fact that most coefficient estimates on the constituent terms are 
slightly negative should not be over-interpreted given their wide confidence intervals. In principle, 
the negative slopes of the regression lines conditional on the trade partner’s salience being equal to 
zero are consistent with the idea of anticipation effects that make dispute escalation particularly un-
likely in the context of extreme asymmetries in parties’ salience levels.  
     The quantitative interpretation of the coefficient estimates depends on both the units in which 
the variables are measured and the link function of the model. Because 𝐺  and 𝐿  are shares that 
range between 0 to 1, the one-unit change in these quantities implies a change from 0 to 1 – the 
theoretical minimum and maximum of the parties’ salience levels. For the three Linear models in the 
first column of Table 2, this means that a mutual shift from 0 to 1 in both 𝐺  and 𝐿 , indicates 
an predicted increase in maximum escalation of (–1.789) + (–0.745) + 8.823 = 6.289 levels, an increase 
in dispute intensity of (–10.504) + 4.327 + 74.007 = 67.83 points, and an increase in dispute duration of 
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(–1.212) + (–0.329) + 9.735 = 8.194 years while holding all other factors constant.  
     These results clearly suggest a substantial shift through large fractions of the scale of the respective 
escalation measures for a mutual increase in salience from 0 to 1. Although it needs to be kept in 
mind that the non-interval-scaled maximum escalation and dispute intensity variables are approximations, 
the general trend is readily apparent and substantial. A similar picture emerges from the other models 
(for space reasons, I relegate the discussion of these results to Appendix F, along with various alter-
native specifications and robustness checks that further substantiate the clear pattern emerging from 
Table 2).  
     It is also interesting to consider the coefficient estimates on 𝑀 . Because 𝑀  is measured in bil-
lion US$, the Linear model predicts that a one-billion increase in trade increases maximum escalation 
by 0.044 levels. Increases on a similar scale are suggested by the other models. Although the coeffi-
cient is significant in almost all cases, an increase on this scale appears not to be particularly pro-
nounced given that US$ 1 billion is a sizable amount of trade (the mean bilateral industry-level trade 
volume in the data is US$ 0.774 billion, the maximum is US$ 117 billion). In line with theoretical 
expectations, this suggests that the (absolute) trade volume as such is much less relevant for dispute 
escalation than the parties’ (relative) stakes in the given trade relationship.15  
 
Figure 6: Interaction Surface Derived from the Linear Model with DV I. Maximum Escalation  
 
 
 
In terms of general model fit, the maximum escalation and dispute intensity models appear to fit the data 
                                                            
15 Alternative specifications with 𝑀  instead of 𝑀  (or both) do not change this pattern. As discussed 
in the previous section, 𝑀  is the theoretically correct anchor for the two ratio-type salience measures. 
𝐺  𝐿  
𝐸𝑠𝑐  
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better than the dispute duration model. This is indicated both by the smaller standard errors across all 
models and the higher R-squared values of the Linear models. This supports the notion that the two 
former measures are more direct measures of escalation than dispute duration. The fact that this pattern 
is apparent from the results, as one would expect on theoretical grounds, lends further support to the 
overall results.  
     Figure 6 graphically represents the predicted interaction surface for the two salience measures 𝐺  and 𝐿 . The figure is based on the results of the Linear model with the maximum escalation 
dependent variable. The surface is given by 
 𝐸𝑠𝑐 = 𝛼 + 𝛾 + 𝛾 + 𝛽 𝐺 + 𝛽 𝐿 + 𝛽 𝐺 𝐿 + 𝛿𝑀 , 
 
where 𝐸𝑠𝑐  is the escalation level predicted from the estimated coefficients 𝛽 , 𝛽 , and 𝛽  for 
different combinations of 𝐺  and 𝐿  across the {0, 1} range. The tildes indicate that these quan-
tities are simulated for the purpose of the prediction. The expression 𝛼 + 𝛾 + 𝛾  comprises the 
estimated intercept and the means (indicated by the overbars) of the dyad and product fixed-effects. 
The term 𝛿𝑀  is the mean trade flow value multiplied by its estimated coefficient. For the purpose 
of plotting, all these factors are treated as constants and, as a sum, determine the ‘intercept’ offset 
when both salience measures are zero.  
     Averaging over these quantities implies that Figure 6 shows the predicted escalation levels for an 
average dyad, an average product, and an averagely-sized absolute trade volume. This means that as 
trade flows change or different industries or trade partners are concerned, the entire surface of the 
regression plane shifts up or down while the form of the overall relationship remains the same. The 
regression plane rises steeply as both salience levels increase, and remains at low levels if either or 
both variables take on low values.  
 
Figure 7: Conditional Slope Estimates from the Linear Model with DV I. Maximum Escalation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 U.S. Salience: 𝐺  Trade Partner Salience: 𝐿  
𝐺 = 0 
𝐺 = 1 
𝐿 = 0 
𝐿 = 1 
m
ax
. e
sc
al
at
io
n 
U.S. Salience: 𝐺  Trade Partner Salience: 𝐿  
(9) 
  
m
ax
. e
sc
al
at
io
n 
𝐺 0 
𝐺 = 1 
𝐿 0 
𝐿 = 1 
30 
 
 
This strongly conditional relationship can also be seen from a different perspective. Recall that in an 
interaction, the steepness of the slope describing the relationship between 𝐸𝑠𝑐  and 𝐺 , i.e., (𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐿 ), changes with 𝐿 . The same holds in reverse. Figure 7 illustrates these changes in slopes 
for the two extreme cases where the respective other variable switches from 0 to 1. The figure essen-
tially combines the four vertical faces of the cube in Figure 7 above into two panels. It also shows 
the 95 percent confidence intervals, which are calculated following Friedrich (1982).  
     Once more, the key point to note is how, in each case, the predicted effect of one salience variable 
on maximum escalation levels switches from slightly negative to strongly positive as the second sali-
ence variable shifts from zero to one. For instance, if a trade partner’s salience level equals 0, even a 
shift to very high salience for the U.S. is not predicted to lead to an increase in dispute escalation. On 
the other hand, if the trade partner’s salience level equals 1, each increase in salience for the U.S. is 
predicted to considerably increase dispute escalation. Insofar, the two plots condense the essence of 
Hypothesis 1 and substantiate a key part of the theoretical mechanism outlined above.  
6 Analysis II: Dispute Outcomes as a Function of Dispute Escalation 
This section is concerned with jointly testing Hypotheses 2 and 3. It analyzes the relationship between 
a) the level of dispute escalation, and b) both the trend (mean) and variability (variance) of changes 
in trade flows. These observable changes of trade flows are intended to capture the unobservable 
changes in trade policies and therefore the essence of eventual dispute outcomes.  
6.1 Methods 
Testing Hypotheses 2 and 3 requires a statistical technique that, unlike regular regression methods, 
explicitly allows modeling not only the mean but also the variance of an outcome variable as a func-
tion of a set of predictors. A variance function regression is an appropriate tool for this purpose (Western 
and Bloome 2009; also see: Aitkin 1987, Harvey 1976, Nelder and Lee 1991). By allowing for changes 
in the variance of the dependent variable as a function of the predictors, a variance function regres-
sion is a method to directly model heterogeneity in the residual variance of a regression. This differs 
from standard regression settings, where the residual variance is viewed as unexplained. Moreover, 
since residual heterogeneity implies heteroscedasticity, it is usually treated as a nuisance in standard 
statistical applications because it violates traditional regression assumptions. In the present context, 
however, the residual variance of the dependent variable is of substantive interest.  
     Figure 8 presents descriptive plots of the ∆𝑋  against the maximum escalation and the dispute 
intensity measures. Visual inspection suggests that there is indeed an upward trend in mean and a 
downward trend in variances as escalation levels increase. In the following, the ∆𝑋  data, proxying 
dispute outcomes, will serve as the dependent variable while the two escalation measures will now 
serve as the primary independent variables of interest.  
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Figure 8: Implied Trade Policy Changes Plotted Against Escalation Levels  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The dashed gray line is the zero line, the solid black line is the univariate regression slope, and the solid gray 
lines represent the two-dimensional kernel density of the data points.  
 
In implementing the variance function regression, I follow the iterative maximum likelihood proce-
dure of Western and Bloome (2009). While this approach works through an iterative optimization 
algorithm, the basic logic can be understood from the first two implementation steps. The first step 
relates the predictors to the mean of the dependent variable, thereby producing initial estimates of 
the first set of coefficients. The second step relates the predictors to the variance of the dependent 
variable, resulting in initial estimates of the second set of coefficients. All further steps serve to obtain 
efficient estimates and correct standard errors. The first step consists of fitting a simple OLS regres-
sion. Specifically, I specify the model as 
 ∆𝑋 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐸𝑠𝑐 + 𝛽 𝐹𝑦𝑟 +  𝛽 𝐷𝑢𝑟 + 𝜀 , 
  
where 𝛽  is an intercept, 𝛽  through 𝛽  are standard regression coefficients that capture the relation-
ship between the change in the mean of ∆𝑋  associated with changes in the predictors, and 𝜀  
is an error term that is assumed to be normally distributed. 𝐸𝑠𝑐  is either maximum escalation or 
dispute intensity. These are the right-hand-side variables of primary interest. The procedure is run sep-
arately for each of these variables. Two additional variables are added to model the time dependencies 
in the data. 𝐹𝑦𝑟  indicates the first dispute year and 𝐷𝑢𝑟  is the duration of the dispute meas-
ured as the time distance between the (middle years of) the two time windows.  
     The 𝐹𝑦𝑟  variable is intended to capture shocks to trade flows that  are associated with a given 
year, such as the effects of the dotcom crisis or the 2008 financial crisis. The 𝐷𝑢𝑟  variable is 
intended to capture the effects of the general drift in trade volumes over time. In particular, trade 
max. escalation dispute intensity 
(10) 
∆𝑋
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flows typically increase over time due to economic growth. This implies that longer durations be-
tween time windows are naturally associated with increases in trade volumes, irrespective of escala-
tion processes. The variable is therefore important to account for this source of export growth. I do 
not consider dispute duration (the third summary statistic of dispute activity from above) in this part of 
the analysis because maximum escalation or dispute intensity are more direct measures of escalation (as 
argued above) and because the overlap with the 𝐷𝑢𝑟  variable makes an interpretation of this 
measure difficult. For the maximum escalation or dispute intensity models, I present various alternative 
specifications and robustness checks in the appendix.  
     Estimating equation (10) by OLS yields an initial set of coefficient estimates that capture the rela-
tionship between the predictors and the mean of the dependent variable. It also allows the calculation 
of the residuals, as a precondition for the second implementation step. Easily calculated as observed 
minus predicted values, I first compute the predicted values as 
 ∆𝑋 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐸𝑠𝑐 + 𝛿 𝐹𝑦𝑟 +  𝛿 𝐷𝑢𝑟  
 
to obtain the residuals from  
 𝜀̂ = ∆𝑋 − ∆𝑋 . 
 
For each observation, the residuals specify, in units of the dependent variable, how far away the 
observed values in the data are from the predicted regression plane. Hypothesis 3 suggests that the 
residual variance decreases with increasing levels of escalation. One would therefore expect residuals 
for observations associated with higher levels of escalation to be smaller on average than those asso-
ciated with lower levels of escalation.  
     This proposition can directly be tested. Using a gamma regression with a log link function, I re-
gress the squared residuals from equation (10) on the same set of predictors as before. This gives a 
model of the form 
 𝜀̂  = 𝑔(𝜆 + 𝜆 𝐸𝑠𝑐 + 𝜆 𝐹𝑦𝑟 + 𝜆 𝐷𝑢𝑟 +  𝜗 ), 
 
where 𝜆  is an intercept, 𝜆  through 𝜆  are regression coefficients, 𝑔(. ) is the log link function of the 
gamma regression and 𝜗  is the associated error term. I use the squared residuals because the 
interest is in the absolute size of the residuals rather than in their direction (here the symmetry im-
posed by the log-ratio specification in equation (7) is useful). The gamma regression is used because 
the squared residuals are non-negative and have a right-skewed distribution.  
     After step two of the procedure, initial estimates for the sets of mean and variance coefficients 𝜷 
and 𝝀 are obtained. The remainder of the procedure serves to correct two problems. First, the stand-
ard errors for the second stage do not take into account the uncertainty from the first stage. Second, 
the estimates of the first stage are inefficient as a result of the heteroscedasticity in ∆𝑋 . To address 
these issues, the following iterative procedure is employed. First, obtain fitted values from the gamma 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
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regression as 
 𝜎 =  𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜆 + 𝜆 𝐸𝑠𝑐 + 𝜆 𝐹𝑦𝑟 + 𝜆 𝐷𝑢𝑟 +  𝜗 ). 
 
Next, estimate a weighted linear squares (WLS) regression of ∆𝑋  on the set of predictors, using 1/𝜎  as weights. This step is a re-estimation of step one and mitigates the effects of heteroscedas-
ticity by down-weighting the influence of observations with larger residuals. From the WLS regres-
sion, one obtains updated estimates for 𝜷 and 𝜀̂ . The new estimates of 𝜀̂  are then used as the 
dependent variables in a renewed gamma regression, which produces. This allows the calculation of 
updated estimates of 𝜎 .  
     The estimates of 𝜀̂  and 𝜎  are then used in the joint maximum likelihood estimation of 𝜷 
and 𝝀 by iterating the weighted least squares and gamma regressions. Following Harvey (1976) and 
Aitkin (1987), the kernel of the log-likelihood for the normal distribution underlying the least squares 
stage is given by  𝑙(𝜷, 𝝀) = − 12 ln 𝜎 + 𝜀̂ /𝜎 . 
 
The iterative procedure consists of evaluating the log-likelihood after each round of updating and 
assessing the difference between the new and the old value of the log-likelihood. The procedure is 
repeated until convergence, that is, until the difference between the new and old values falls below a 
previously specified threshold. At this stage, the standard errors for both models are correct.  
6.2 Results 
Table 3 shows the results of the procedure. The columns marked by 𝛽 and 𝜆 report the estimated 
mean and variance coefficients, respectively. As can be seen, the 𝛽 coefficient on the 𝐸𝑠𝑐  varia-
ble is positive and statistically significant in both the maximum escalation and the dispute intensity models. 
These results support Hypothesis 2, which predicts larger increases in export volumes for the United 
States following disputes that have escalated further.  
 
Table 3: Variance Function Regression Results  
 𝐸𝑠𝑐 = Maximum Escalation  𝐸𝑠𝑐 = Dispute Intensity 
 𝛽 𝜆  𝛽 𝜆 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 
 
0.087*** 
(0.010) 
–1.252*** 
(0.061) 
 0.087*** 
(0.010) 
–1.255*** 
(0.061) 𝐸𝑠𝑐  
 
0.030** 
(0.011) 
–0.138* 
(0.070)  
0.026* 
(0.011) 
–0.210** 
(0.080) 𝐹𝑦𝑟  0.007 
(0.011) 
–0.026 
(0.064) 
 0.003 
(0.010) 
–0.017 
(0.063) 𝐷𝑢𝑟  
 
0.026 
(0.014) 
0.154 
(0.069)  
 0.021 
(0.015) 
0.233** 
(0.079) 𝑁 2767 2767  2767 2767 
 
(14) 
(15) 
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Notes: The dependent variable is ∆𝑋 as defined in equation (7). The columns with 𝛽 and 𝜆 report the estimated 
mean and variance coefficients, respectively. Both sets of coefficients are given for standardized predictor variables; 𝛽 and 𝜆 therefore capture the average changes in the mean and the variance of the dependent variable associated 
with changes in the predictors by one standard deviation. 𝑁 is smaller here than for the results reported in Table 2, 
because not all dispute histories have trade reported at both time windows and because no time windows can be 
calculated for non-cases that have no start and end dates; ***, **, and * indicate significance at the .001, .01 and .05 
levels, respectively. 
 
Furthermore, the 𝜆 coefficient on the 𝐸𝑠𝑐𝑈𝑆𝑗𝑘 variable is negative and statistically significant for both 
models. These results support Hypothesis 3, which states that the variability in implied trade conces-
sions decreases as disputes escalate further. The negative 𝜆 estimates are consistent with the idea that 
more intense disputes are associated larger compromises from both sides. Overall, my results present 
evidence in support of Hypotheses 2 and 3 and lend further credence to the theoretical mechanism 
I propose to govern the escalation and bargaining patterns of trade disputes.  
7 Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper, I explored the bargaining and escalation patterns of trade disputes. Specifically, I ex-
amined industry-level disputes between the United States and its trade partners over the latter’s im-
port policies. I not only investigated dispute escalation as a function of the parties’ political salience 
in the given trade relationship. I also examined the pattern of eventual dispute outcomes as a function 
of escalation levels. In this context, I make empirical, methodological, and theoretical contributions 
that are of immediate interest of scholars working on trade disputes. This includes the compiled data 
on government salience, dispute events, and dispute outcomes. In the following, I briefly discuss two 
of these contributions before highlighting the policy implications of my results in some more detail.   
     On the one hand, I provided a method for measuring parties salience’ in their bilateral industry-
level trade relations. My approach is firmly rooted in exiting theoretical knowledge on international 
trade and political economy. Based on my trade barrier data, I employed a trade policy simulation to 
calculate the counterfactual gains and losses that would accrue to foreign and domestic producers in a 
given industry, respectively, if import barriers were to be reduced. Assessing and quantifying the im-
portance that governments attach to their various trade relations in a systematic, comparable, and 
theory-guided manner has so far not been possible. Insofar, my method closes an important gap that 
has long posed challenges for research on trade policy.  
     On the other hand, I have theoretically and empirically pointed to the systematic relation between 
the pattern of government salience and the patterns in dispute escalation and dispute outcomes. I 
suggested that escalation decisions are driven by incentives to manipulate the costliness of bargaining. 
The starting point is that higher salience in an issue have an effect analogous to reducing parties’ costs 
of conflict. Because higher salience levels make parties more cost-tolerant, high-salience parties profit 
in expectation by intentionally creating additional costs through escalation behavior. I illustrated how 
this expectation results in costly compromises in the event that two high-salience parties interact and 
how the pattern of dispute outcomes becomes more varied in other constellations.  
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     To conclude, I briefly discuss the implications of my work for policy-making and dispute mitiga-
tion at the WTO and beyond. In particular, I point to the options for third parties to anticipate, 
mitigate, and manage trade disputes. I further highlight how these options may, in the long term, 
contribute to a more comprehensive reform of the rules for trade policy reporting.  
 It follows from the above discussion that dispute intensity tends to change with a number of 
factors. First, dispute intensity increases with (1) the lower of the parties’ (relative) salience level. This 
is because the party with lower salience levels selects out of a dispute first. Irrespective of which side 
does so, this ends the escalation process. Second, dispute intensity increases with (2) the parties’ 
absolute salience levels, which anchors the parties’ relative salience levels on a fixed level of reference. 
In the context of trade disputes, this has been the total industry-level value of imports faced by the 
importer. Third, dispute intensity decreases as (3) the costs of a dispute increase relative to the com-
bined effect of the parties’ absolute and relative salience levels. That is, higher relative escalation costs 
imply lower escalation levels – all else equal.  
     Fourth, dispute intensity increases with (4) the level of uncertainty the parties face because under 
greater uncertainty, the parties take longer to come to an agreement. Lastly, by implication, dispute 
intensity increases with (5) the rate of change in the parties’ dispute-relevant characteristics and, in 
particular, their salience levels. The rate of change matters for dispute behavior both because uncer-
tainty will generally spread faster in quickly changing environments and because such environments 
are more likely to see parties’ characteristics drift away from the status quo agreement. This then 
creates incentives to renegotiate.  
     Adequate knowledge of these factors – both in terms of the mechanism through which they are 
connected and in terms of the values they take on in individual cases – is important to timely identify 
or mitigate emerging trade disputes as well as to effectively help alleviate disputes that have already 
erupted. International organizations (IOs) such as the WTO or UNCTAD that work in the area of 
international trade and trade policy could potentially play a more active role in this context than is 
currently the case. The insights and methods presented in this paper offer opportunities to increase 
the scope of action of international organizations in trade policy monitoring and dispute management 
– irrespective of existing budget and personnel constraints.  
     Such opportunities for IOs apply to a) fact-finding and b) direct dispute management. Concerning 
fact-finding, the methods to estimate the size of trade barriers and to assess the resulting trade inter-
ests of countries makes it possible to get an comprehensive overview of the international trade system 
in terms of broader risk levels. It is necessarily true that quantitative methods cannot replace case 
knowledge in policy contexts where issues are dealt with on a case-by-case basis. However, the meth-
ods provided allow for a systematic identification of priority areas and can efficiently guide case se-
lection for further qualitative research and selective in-depth investigations. In combination with a 
regard to the rate of change in the relevant fundamentals, such efforts may hold the potential for 
building up a systematic monitoring and early-warning system.  
     Concerning direct dispute prevention and management, international trade organizations could 
specifically request further information on individual trade policies, or promote and encourage active 
communication between countries on specific policies, or actively attempt to mediate in selected 
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cases. These efforts would collectively serve the purpose to share information and increase transpar-
ency. Essentially, all these efforts would aim at reducing uncertainty by means other than a dispute – 
and thus limit the potential for costly disputes to emerge or escalate. This would ultimately free re-
sources that countries could dedicate to more productive goals.  
     In the long-term, these activities may support a wider reform of the international trade policy 
reporting system – away from the current voluntary registration scheme and towards a fully institu-
tionalized and binding reporting mechanism. Such a system may still allow exceptions and reward 
transparency through legally sanctioned transitional periods and other escape clauses that have 
proved to be effective in previous efforts towards trade policy governance (e.g., tariff-binding 
schemes or the reporting and implementation rules for anti-dumping, countervailing duties, and safe-
guards). Ultimately, such a system would increase transparency and predictability and thus help re-
duce the incidence and severity of trade disputes.  
     In any of these situations, theoretical knowledge enables dispute managers to know where to look. 
Once concrete cases for direct action are identified, theoretical knowledge also enables dispute man-
agers to know what can be tweaked. This may not be obvious from the specific situation alone, where 
the intricate nature and idiosyncratic features of the case can obstruct the view on the aspects of 
greatest importance. Theoretical knowledge can help dispute managers to see through these com-
plexities.  
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